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Korea's ability to keep the economy from going off the rails has
been as remarkable as its achievement of high long-run growth
rates.  The key to the success of Korea's labor policy - state
guidelines limited the wage increases under structural adjust-
ment - was the high rate of total factor productivity growth.
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Korea is an interesting case study in long-term  The wage-setting mechanism seems to have
and short-term adjustment.  Korea's rate of  been strongly influenceu by state guidelines,
economic growth after 1965 was high at a time  which encouraged wage increases as incentive
of rapid, fundamental economic restructuring.  payments but kept them within the limits of
Korea's open, export-oriented economy - productivity increases - subject to the necessity
dependent on imports of oil and intermediate  of dealing with short-run shocks.
inputs  - was exposed to oil price shocks and
interest rate hikes.  The key to the success of Korea's labor
policies was the high rate of total factor produc-
To keep up the rate of investment, Korea  tivity growth. This also allowed for continued
borrowed heavily in the world market - and  nominal devaluation of the won without trigger-
appeared to be highly vulnerable.  And it had a  ing secondary pressures on domestic costs or
history of walking a tightrope between inflation-  damaging extemal competitiveness.
ary pressures and balance of payments deficits.
The above points pertain to the behavior cf
Korea's ability to keep the economy from  the large-scale "formal" sector of the economy.
derailing has been as remarkable as its achieve-  But wage employment in small firms and the
ment of high long-term growth rates.  self-employed constitute a sizeable part of the
labor market.  How did labor eamings in these
Mazumdar concludes that wage behavior in  sectors perform relative to the wage gains in the
the formal sector played a significant role in  formal sector? For lack of data Mazumdar
adjustment, but not because there was an elastic  focused on farm workers, wage eamers in small
supply of labor at a stagnant wage during  firms, and also a section of the workforce whose
expansion.  On the contrary, real wages rose  relative eamings have been low throughout -
impressively throughout the period of growth.  that is, female workers.
But real wage increases lagged behind the
growth rate of labor productivity (except during  Women and workers in the farm sector and
the "big push" of the late 1970s). And during  small firms shared to some extent in wage
the years after the oil shock real wages stagnated  increases, but the long-term record for these
or even declined somewhat despite a spurt in  groups is not entirely satisfactory.
productivity.
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Annex  471.  Cycles In the  Korean Economy
Recent economic history of Korea can  be broken down  into the following four
phases:  The period (1965-73) was a period of sustained growth rate in the GDP, which
although  varying  from  year  to  year  was  at  a  generally  high  level  (Figure  1).1
Difficulties  emerged after the first  oil shock.  It led  to  a period  in which  government
economic policy leaned towards one of fostering development in heavy industry so as to
make the economy  less dependent  on the vagaries of the world economy. This policy led to
a faster build up of foreign debt, so that when the second oil price hike and interest rate
hike struck, the economy went into a depression in the early 80s-the  first  time when
the average rate of growth of real GDP actually fell below zero.  The depression however,
was  extremely  short-lived.  As  in  other  Southeast  Asian  countries  (other  than  the
Philippines) the economy was able to adjust very quickly to the external shocks (which
were indeed aggravated by internal shocks), and the recovery since 1982 has been rapid
and sustained.
Phase l:  The period of export-led  growth (1965-1973)
This was the period of export led growth in Korea.  As can be seen from Figure 2,
the  barter  terms  of  trade  either  increased  or  were  constant  (except  for  one  year,
1969), while the income terms of trade increased at a very high rate from year to year.
In fact, throughout the period the lowest annual  rate of growth of the income terms of
trade was 30  percent, and in most years it was well above this.  This was the period
when the outward looking strategy of Korea was getting established in a spectacular  way.
The current account was,  however, in  deficit throughout this period  (Figure 1),
and until 1971 the annual percentage rate of growth of the deficit  accelerated.  It also
went up sharply as a percentage of GNP from -3.7 percent in 1966-67 to -8.9 percent
in  1971.
1  The basic time-series in which the graphs are based is given in Annex Table Al.
The  income  terms  of  trade  shows  the  real  value  of  exports in  terms  of  importable
capacity.  It is the index of the value of exports divided by the index of import prices.2
Figure  1
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The reason for this deficit was the high rate of Investment  sustained  at a level
higher  than the domestic  rate of savings. Foreign  borrowing  was used to bridge  the gap,
as  well  as to take care of  the  diminishing role of  foreign aid.  "Firms (specially
exporters)  were given strong  incentives  to borrow  abroad. A system  of loan guarantees
substantially  reduced  the risks and the real cost of borrowing  was negative."  (Collins,  p.
6).  External  debt as a percentage  of GNP reached  a level over 30 percent  by ihe ond of
the period.  But because  of the increase  in the export-GNP  ratio, the ratio of debt to
exports-which  ultimately  determined  Korea's  ability  to  finance  the  debt-fell
significantly  towards the end of the period  (Figure 3).
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The  role of  the  public  sector in  maintaining the  high  rate of  investment  was
limited.  This, together with  the fact that  tax revenue as  a percentage of GNP nearly
doubled over this period (Dornbusch and Park, Figure 2, p. 408), held the budget deficit
at a relatively modest level.  Except for 1972 whei  the deficit was 4.6 percent of GNP,
the ratio was generally 2 percent or less.
Phase 2.  Period of directed heavy industrialization and the shadow of crisis (1973-79)
Korea's difficulties in  the 70s started with  the slowdown in  the world economy
following the  increase  in the  price of  oil.  As  an oil  importer, Korea was  nurt by the
price hike itself.  The reduction in the volume of exports aggravated the situation.  As can
be seem from Figure 2, the percentage change in the income terms of trade was negative
for the first  time in  1974, and even when  it  tecovered  to positive  levels it was-with
the  exception  of  1975-well  below  the  levels  reached  in  the  earlier  period.  The
government, however, decided to counter the economic slowdcwn with  a "big push" in
the irvestment program in the heavy and chemical industries.  In spite of tie  fa!l in the
domestic  savings  ratio  in  the  aftermath of  the  slowdown,  Korea  elected  to  "borrow
through  the  crisis"  to  keep  up  its  planned  investment rate.  In  1974 and  1975 the
debVGDP ratio  together with  the budget deficit/GNP ratio reached their  highest levels
(although  neither  was  excessive  by,  say,  Latin  American  standards).  Government
intervention in the form of greater direction of  investment decisions increased, as  did
the  chief  instruments  of  control-import  restriction  and  credit  rationing.  In  addition,
the exchange rate whicn had been allowed to drift downwards throughout the previous
period was  fixed  in  the period  1975-79, and the  real  exchange rate was  allowed  to
appreciate.  While  it  helped importers of intermediate  goods and  materials,  it clearly
corroded Korea's international competitiveness.
This phass of economic policy in Korea has been the subject of controversy.  It
has been justified on the grounds that it laid the basis for long-run diversification of the
Korean economy (and its external trade)  away from light  industry.  Although  it  might
have been costly in terms of immediate reallocation, the policy has been commended for
wisely anticipating long-run changes in comparative advantage.
In  any  event,  the  Korean  economy  recovered  to  some  extent  following  the
recovery of  the world economy in 1975 and 1976.  It also benefited from the export of
skilled labor to the Middle East and the subsequent flow of remittances.  But the shadow5
of a crisis which the events of this period generated lingered, leading to the major
depression  at the  end  of the  decade.
Phase 3.  The Crisis and Adjustment  (1979-82)
As in 1974, the second oil price hike triggered the depression  with the barter
terms of trade registering  negative  percentage  changes  in 1979, 1980 and 1981. The
annual rate of change  of the income  terms of trade was also negative  in 1979 and 1980
(figure 2).  GDP growth rate fell and for the first time was negative in  1980.  As
domestic savings plunged, current account deficits mushroomed. External borrowing
was resorted  to on a large  scale. This was the period  of the most rapid accumulation  of
foreign debt in Korean history.  The debt/GNP ratio climbed from 32 to 53 percent
during these years-equalling the level of some Latin American  borrowers,  e.g. Brazil.
Internal balance  was also disrupted  severely, inflation rates reaching levels well above
those seen in the 60s and 70s (with the exception  of the years of the previous  crisis,
1974-75)  (Figure  4).
Figure  4
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As we shall see In more  detail  in the next  section,  even  while  Korea  stepped  up Its
external  borrowing  levels to record levels in response  to the crisis following  the second
oil shock, it  had already started to take steps to  increase Korea's competitiveness,
particularly  through  wage and exchange  rate policies. At the same  time, further  steps In
adjustment were taken In fiscal, monetary and industrial policies.  The package  of
policir3 had immediate  effect in restoring  internal  and external  balance. By the end of
1982,  the rate of inflation  and the current  account  deficit had been reduced  drastically.
Phase  4.  Recovery  and Growth  (1982-to  date)
The rate of growth of GDP was negative  only in 1980, but it was still low by
Korean standards  in 1981 and 1982.  The economic  measures  taken in these years,
however,  prepared  Korea  for a strong  positive  response  when world trade rebounded  in
1983-84. As can be seen from Figure 1, the growth rate of the economy  increased
substantially. This also produced  ai. increase in domestic savings, which helped to
reduce  the deficit  in the current  account  of the balance  of payments.  When  a slowdown  in
the world economy  threatened  to produce  another  dip in the growth rate in 1985,  Korea
countered  by substantial  real depreciations  of the exchange  rate. But an important  point
to note is that devaluation  did not add fuel to the inflationary  spiral as it seems  to have
done in 1979-80. On the contrary,  the achievement  of internal balance sustained  the
low rate of inflation  attained  at the end of 1982.
Since 1986, Korea has been experiencing  a remarkable  economic  boom,  with a
growth rate of 12 percent in each of these years 1986-88. As in earlier periods,  the
boom has been fueled by a remarkable  rate of growth of exports-which could, in its
turn, be traced to a variety  of external  factors,  including  the low and stable j,rice of oil,
the appreciation  of the yen, and continued  strong  growth in the OECD  economies. The
concern  of the foreign  debt which had loomed  large  in the early 80s has disappeared  as
the current  account  surpluses  generated  by the export  boom have been used to prepay
part of the liabilities.
Inflation had  been kept under control until  1988, when it  showed signs of
accelerating.  The threat of  incipient inflation is the product of  new developments
particularly  in the foreign exchange  and labor n arkets.  The liquidity influx from trade
surplus-together with capital inflows-threaten appreciation  of the won beyond levels
which are considered  "safe"  from the point-of-view  of external competitiveness.  At the7
same  time, new developments  in the labor  market  threatened  to create  wage  inflation  of a
kind which  had not been seen so far in Korean  history. Mu-, of this new set of problems
and concerns  are outside the scope of this paper since we are mainly concerned  with
Korea's success  in adjustment  policies after the shocks  of 1978-74  and 1979-80. We
will, however,  refer to the labor market  developments  of the late 80s insofar  as it helps
a  better understanding of  Korean wage movements during the earlier periods of
adjustment.8
11.  The  Characteristics  of  Korean Stabilization and
Adjustment  Policies
It is now well known that the myth that the Korean  development  process was
fueled by unregulated  free markets  is a false one.  The goverrnment  both during the
regime  of Park (who was assassinated  in 1979)  and subsequently  played  a determined
regulatory role.  The package of  policies involved both bringing about structural
adjustments  in the economy and pushing thre !-h  stabilization measures when the
economy  threatened  to go off the rails due to exts4rnal  and/or internal  shocks. It is useful
to  review the salient features of this package before we turn to  a  more det;.iled
discussion  of labor markets.
The major strategy in the industrialization  of Korea has been the promotion  of
exports. Exports  as a percentage  of GNP rose  from less than 3 percent  in the 1950s  to
15 percent in 1969 and to 35 percent in the early 80s.  This, however,  did not mean
that the domestic  market  was ignored-even for those  industries,  like textiles,  which  had
heavy  involvement in  exports.  Korea's tariff  system was  dualistic.  Imported
intermediate  inputs could be duty-free, but industries  targeted for development  were
granted tariff protection. When the export growth of textiles threatened  to slow down,
Korea embarked  on the policy of "big-push"  after the first oil crisis with a shift from
light to heavy industry.
The major instruments  of targeted industrial development  were licensing and
credit policy.  The Economic  Planning  Board (EPB) which was responsible  for targeting
had control over licensing  as well as credit.  If a proposal  originated  from the private
sector, the EPB had to approve  it, and if it complement  .*  she  EPB's overall strategy,
credit would be arranged by the Ministry of  Finance.  If, on the other hand, the
government  took the initiative,  the EPB would typically  find a private firm to undertake
the project rather than set up a public enterprise.
Amsden points out:  "Government  control of credit differentiated  Korean and
Japanese  development. The Japanese  zaibatsu owned  their own banks whereas  the
Korean  chaebol did not... Direction  of the economy  was more  centralized  because  power
over the purse was more centralized." 2
2  Amsden,  p. 5.9
The central role of the state In credit for  Industry was possible because of
financial repression. Although  Korea has a less centrally  controlled  non-bank  financial
sector  as well as a curb market,  the official banking  sector has been dominant  at least
until the 1980s.  Generally,  deposit rates were kept low-and  were even sometimes
negative  in real terms. The Implicit  tax on depositors  helped to channel resources  into
investment  in targeted  areas,  and to finance  budget  deficits  in a non-inflationary  way. 3
Nowhere was control over financial flows more Important  than in the oxternal
capital account. The government  maintained  tight control over foreign  borrowing. Both
short and iong-term  borrowing  required  government  approval. "But the repayments  of
interest and principal on loans (were) guaranteed by the banks owned or strictly
controlled by the government  or by the government  its 5f." 4 The governinent  used
foreign borrowing  for three purposes.  First, it was used to bridge the gap between
domestic savings and investment,  and thus maintain  a rate of investment  higher than
what would nave been possible  from strictly domestic  savings.  Secondly,  it was used
alonr' with the control over domestic  credit to support the priorities  of restructuring  the
economy. Thirdly,  and not the least important,  use of borrowing  was  to tide over balance
of payments  difficulties originating  from internal  or external shocks.
Along with many  other economies,  specialty,  in Latin America,  Korea had a rising
debt/GNP ratio throughout  the period 1965-82,  and also it increased  strikingly in the
years of crisis, 1974-75  and 1979-80. But Korea  managed  to avoic the development  of
the crises into prolonged  difficulties  which dampened  long-run  growth. In fact, in each
of the two cases of external  shocks  which Korea experienced  as an oil importer,  it took
no more than two or three years for the stabilization  measures  to be successful,  the
debt/GNP  ratio  to fall and sustained  growth  to be resumed.
The effective  control  over the external  flow of funds  clearly helped. Unlike  many
countries  of  Latin America,  the crisis was not deepened  by capital flight.  The major
3  For more  details, see Dornbosch  and Park,  pp. 417-19,  and the references  cited
therein.
4  Yung Chul Park in Wong and Krause,  p. 226.  Park makes  the point that for
practical  purposes, "there  is  no  point  in  distinguishing private  borrowing from
governrnrnt  indebtedness."1 0
difference with Latin America, however, was the substantially lower level of  debt-
export ratio in Korea.  In 1981 this was 76.6 while the major countries facing difficult
problems in the 80s-Argentina,  Brazil, Chile or Mexico-had  debt-export  ratios that
were three to five times higher than Korea's.  Thus in Korea, in the period 1980-83
debt servicing  was below the level of exports, but In the Latin American countries It
exceaded  exports  by anywhere  between  30 and 100 percent 5
The maintenance  of export  growth has thus been as important  for Korea's  long-
term economic  development  as it has for successful  response  to the shocks. The factors
affecting external competitiveness  are thus of central importance  in the analysis of
Korean policies of  adjustment and stabilization.  The behavior of  average wages,
particularly in the export oriented manufacturing  sector, together with other factors
affecting  unit labor costs, are the relevant  issues to discuss in this connection. This is
the subject  of the next  section.
5  See Sachs, p. 533, Table 4 and pp. 532-35  for further discussion  on the Asia-
Latin America  difference.I  1
111.  Determinants of  Unit Labor Cost and Wage
Behavior  In  Korean  Manufacturing
The central statistic to look at for external  competitiveness  of an economy  is the
unit labor cost of the exporting  country in the international  market.  Thus It has to
be the unit labor cost expressed  in, say, dollars.
We  define
Uc = W/V  1/e  ... (1)
where  Uc = unit labor cost in dollars
W  = wages  per worker
V = value  added  per worker
e =  the exchange  rate (wons  per dollar)
The three elements  in determining  unit labor cost in world prices are (i) wage
behavior, (ii) the changes in labor productivity,  and (iii) the course of the exchange
rate. To some  extent  these  three  factors  are interconnected,  but clearly  all three need  to
be analyzed  for our purposes.
Korea has always followed an active exchange  rate policy, together with the
control  over external  capital  flows described  above. As can be seen from Table 111.1,  the
exchange rate  depreciated continuously between 1968 and  1975.  There were
particularly large depreciations  during the crisis periods of 1971-72 and 1975.  The
won was fixed to the dollar between  1976  and 1979. But the active  devaluation  of the
currency  was resumed  following  the second  oil crisis. There was a maxi-devaluation  in
1980 as after the first oil shock.  We will be looking in greater detail below at these
episodes  of short-run  adjustment.
The more  or less  continuous  devaluation  of the currency  was necessary  because
inflation  rates  in Korea,  as has been mentioned  in Section  I, has been  persistently  double
digit (see Figure  4, p. 6) until the post-1982  period. There  has been a correspondingly
continuous  pressure  for the real exchange  rate to increase  which  had to be countered  by
devaluation  to maintain  competitiveness.1 2
Devaluation has, however, not been always a successful measure to prevent the
real exchange rate from increasing in open economies like Korea which had to import a
lot of its materials and intermediate goods, including oil.  The higher unit cost of imports
adds to the inflationary spiral.  In the Korean case there is one additional route through
which devaluation could enhance the rate of inflation.  Korean food policy has the dual
objective of supporting a high price for the farmer, and enabling consumers to buy at a
lower  price  (although  still  higher  than  world  prices).  The  difference  between  the
buying and selling prices creates a deficit for the Grain Management Fund (GMF) which
is used to administer the policy.  Apart trom domestic procurement, the government has
had to import a substantial amount of rice and barley to hold down selling prices.  Thus
with devaluation, the deficit of the GMF increases.  Although food prices are not directly
affected,  the  inflationary  impact  of  the devaluation  through  an  increase  in  the fiscal
deficit could be significant.
But as is apparent from the Figure 4, Korea, although walking on the inflationary
tightrope had never been faced with the problems of spiraling inflation.  Inflation rates
jumped  to rather  high rates of  25-30 percent in  both the  periods of  maxi-devaluation
(associated with  the oil  price shocks), but was brought down to moderate levels very
quickly-and  rather  spectacularly  so  in  the  80s.  The  success  story  on  this  point
involves two  main policy and  economic responses.  First, the  budget deficit  (and the
growth of money supply) was controlled.  "The unified budget deficit, although swinging
widely, never reached 5 percent of GNP and never stayed very high for more than two
years in a row." 6 Secondly, a crucial issue is that of the behavior of wages relative to
labor  productivity.
Determinants of Unit Labor Cost
We can use equation (1) to derive the following relationship:
U'c = W  - V  - e-
=  (w'  +  Pc)  - (v' +  P'p)  - e
=  (w'  - v)  +  (Pc  - Pp)  - e-  ...  (2)
The dots represent proportionate rates of change.
The additional variables 3re defined as follows:
6  Dornbusch  and  Park,  p.  414.  See  pp.  414-17  of  this  paper  for  further
discussion of this point.1  3
w = real wage (in terms  of consumer  goods)
v =  index of physical  productivity  of labor
PC  = index of cost of living
Pp = index  of prices  of manufactured  goods
Equation  (2) decomposes  the percentage  change  in the unit labor cost into three
elements:  the wage-productivity  gap, the shift in the ratio of consumer to producer
prices;  and the change  in the nominal  exchange  rate. The contribution  of each factor to
the change in unit labor cost is given in Table 111.1.  (The basic data are given for
reference  in the Annex  Table  A.2 ).7
The following  points  in the table are worthy  of emphasis:
(i)  The continuous  depreciation  of the exchange  rate to which  reference  has
already  been made did not lead to an increase  in the price of tradeables
relative  to  the  price  of  non-tradeables (as  approximated by  the
producers' price index relative to the cost of  living index). 8 Thus the
domestic  real exchange  rate generally  moved  against  manufacturing  and
increased  the unit labor cost in most years. This is because  devaluation
did not fully compensate  for inflation.  Nevertheless  it  moderated  the
impact  of inflation,  and as we can see from the Table 111.1,  the magnitude
of the upward  pressure  or; unit labor cost from this source  was small.
(i i)  In the years of crisis and stabilization  policies,  large devaluations  as well
as a substantial  negative  wage-productivity  gap helped  in the reduction  of
unit labor  costs. This happened  in all the three  episodes  of stabilization:
first, in 1971  when the government  acted  to counteract  a temporary
7  It should  be noted  that the wage  series  is really  one of average  earnings  per
worker-the annual  wage  bill dividing  by the number  employed. Basic  wages  as well as
supplementary  payments  to labor are included  in the wage bill.
8  Cereals, an important part of the CPI, although imported  to some extent-are
really non-tradeables  in Korea because  of the administered  price system  operated  by the
Grain Management  Fund. Thus a great deal of the consumer  budget  will be affectively
non-tradeables.1 4
Table  111.1 Annual  Percentage Change  In  Unit  Labor  Costs  and  Its
Components
Wage-  Consumer-Producer  Nominal  Average  Unit Labor
Productivity  Gap  Price Differential  Exchange  Rate  Costs  (in US$)
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  =  (1)  + (2)  - (3)
1968  -6.14  3.88  2.27  -4.52
1969  -7.25  3.69  4.16  -7.72
1970  -3.19  3.70  7.77  -7.27
1971  -16.80  8.65  11.78  -19.93
1972  3.63  -2.44  13.18  -11.98
1973  5.17  -8.78  1.38  -4.99
1974  9.47  -1.57  1.54  6.35
1975  -10.45  4.78  19.66  -25.34
1976  10.37  -0.95  0.00  9.42
1977  7.43  -0.65  0.00  6.78
1978  3.59  1.27  0.00  4.86
1979  17.01  -1.00  0.00  16.00
1980  -9.34  1.99  25.50  -32.86
1981  -16.14  7.58  12.12  -20.68
1982  0.30  2.25  7.35  -4.80
1983  -5.65  0.58  6.11  -11.18
1984  -1.59  1.56  3.90  -3.93
1985  2.97  0.05  7.95  -4.92
1986  -2.47  -1.39  1.31  -5.17
Averages
1967-73  -4.40  1.43  6.66  -9.63
1973-79  6.58  0.29  3.30  3.57
1979-81  -12.60  4.90  18.62  -26.32
1981-86  -1.21  0.60  5.28  -5.89
Source:  "Principal  Economic  Indicators,"  Statistics  Department,  Bank  of  Korea
(CPI and exchange rate)
IFS Yearbook, IMF (deflator)
Industrial Statistics Yearbook, UN (wage bill and value added)1  5
slowdown  in exports;  second, in 1975 following  the first oil price shock;
and thirdly, during the "comprehensive"  stabilization plan of  1980-81.
(iii)  The average  figures given for the three periods 1967-73,  1973-79,  and
1980 to  date  show clearly the  different trends in  unit labor costs
associated  with varying  performances  of the economy. They also help us
to quantify the relative importance  of the wage-productivity  gap and the
exchange  rate movements  in accounting  for movements  in unit labor cuts
(in  dollars).
During the first period of  export expansion unit labor costs declined at  a
substantial  annual  rate of 9.6 percent  per annum. It can be seen that the depreciation  of
the nominal  exchange  rate contributed  as much  as the excess  of productivity  growth  over
wage growth,  to the decline of ULC,  in spite of an adverse  movement  of domestic  real
exchange  rate.  The problem  years after the first oil shock and the "big push"  reversed
the trend in unit labor costs.  It is seen that its sharp increase  in the period 1973-79
was largely  due to the adverse  wage-productivity  gap.  Although  the exchange  rate was
devalued  sharply  in 1975, it will be recalled  that Korea went to a fixed rate for the rest
of the 70s. This policy  was  abandoned  following  the second  oil shock. The experience  of
the  two  years of  adjustment-1980  and  1981-shows  the  large  contribution of
devaluation-rather 50 percent more than the negative wage-productivity  gap-to  the
reduction  of ULC.  But the negative  wage productivity  gap was substantial,  so that the
ULC decline  was massive-offset only slightly  by the increase  in domestic  real exchange
rate.  The continued decline of  ULC until  1986-which  was instrumental in the
recovery-was  again due more to  nominal devaluation than to  the negative wage-
productivity  gap, although the latter contributed  significantly  to it.
Wage-productivity  Trends
We conclude that the behavior of wages relative to productivity has been of
crucial importance  both in the periods of  Korean growth and the short periods of
stabilization.  In developing countries with a  large farming sector, it  is tempting to
assume  a la Lewis  that the negative  wage-productivity  gap which has been observed  is
due to an elastic supply  of labor  at a constant  real wage, while  productivity  growth  in the
modern  sector is significant  due to exogenous  technological  progress-thus leading  to a
fall in unit labor  costs over time. But the Korean  story is different. As can be seen  from1 6
Figure 5,  and Table A.1, real wage growth was more than 5 percent per annum
throughout  the 20-year  period  we have been  considering,  except  in a few selected  years.
As it happens,  these exceptional  years were precisely  the years of Korean stabilization
policies-1971-72,  1975 and  1980-81.  Of these, only  in the  last was real wage
growth  neyative,  but it fell by less than 5 percent. For most of the period,  of course,  the
positive  reai wage  growth  was  well above  5 percent.
The sustained  and substantial  rate of increase  in labor productivity  thus emerges
as a critical variable in the success  of achieving  a continuous  reduction  in unit labor
costs despite  the continuous  devaluation  of the currency. The productivity  growth was
sufficient to counter the rising import costs produced by the devaluation  as well as
permit  a significant  growth  of real wages. In the crisis  years all or more  of the increase
in productivity  went into the reduction  of unit labor costs while real wage growth was
temporarily halted.
The importance  of productivity  growth for the stability of the economy  is also
relevant  for  another  reason-that  of  preventing the  emergency of  inflationary
expectations.  We have seen that until  after the stabilization of  1980-81 Korean
inflation rate has been double-digit  and very high in short bursts.  Yet the economy
never degenerated  into a dangerous  spiral of rising wages and prices.  Stabilization
efforts in most countries  generally  need a period  of stagnation  or even decline in real
wages.  Often this wage effect is produced by an abnormal increase in the rate of
inflation. The success  of the effect  depends  on the subsequent  behavior  of wages  as they
are affected by inflationary  expectations  of workers.  In many developing countries,
particularly  in Latin America,  inflationary  expectations  have been explosive. Periods  of
real wage stability or decline have been followed  by spiraling increases  in wages and
prices, leading to erosion of international  competitiveness,  as workers seek to defend
their real wage unsuccessfully  through accelerating money wage increases.  In an
economy  like that of Korea,  productivity  growth has sustained  a significant  rate of real
wage growth over many years.  Thus the workers' confidence  in the viability of the
economy in improving  their standard  of living is continuously  reinforced.  It is easier
for them to accept temporary  real wage restraint  (or even decline)  without demanding
money  wage increases  which feed an explosive  inflationary  spiral.
While the investment rate in Korea was high, the sustained growth in labor
productivity was, to  a large extent, due to  the growth of  total factor productivity.1 7
FMGURE  5.  REAL VALUE ADDED AND WAGES
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Nishlmuzu  and Robinson  showed  that, over the period  in the 60s and 70s, Korea's  TFP
growth  at 3.7 percent  per annum  was by far the highest  of the countries  covered. 9 The
increasing  efficiency  in the use  of both capital  and labor allowed  Korea  a safe margin  fo.
increase  in real wages without eating into profitability.
Wage  Determination  in Korean  Manufacturing
The increase  in productivity  made  it possible  for wages  to increase. But why did
it  actually do so at the sustained rate that it  did?  What was the  mechanism  of
determining  wages in industry?
For the period  covered  in this study, before  the late 80s, the influence  of unions
on wage levels was minimal. The right to strike was banned by presidential  decree in
1971.  Unions did exist in large firms, particularly in the textiles, metalworking  and
chemical  sectors. But they needed  prior permission  from the government  for collective
bargaining.  Earnings  function studies have found no significant effect of unions on
relative  wages. 10
Wage guidelines  for both white and blue collar workers are specified  from time
to time by the Federation  of Korean Industries  (FKI) as well as by the Federation  of
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU).  The former is dominated  t.  the chaebol,  while the
influence of  government on the latter has been recognized for  some time.  The
government's own  influence was  used to  support wage restraint, as  during the
stabilization  period  of 1980-81,  as well as to ensure  that the workers  received  a share
of productivity  gains in the years  of sustained  growth. 1 1
9  It was 1.3 percent  per annum  in Turkey,  0.5 percent  in Yugoslavia  and 2 percent
in Japan.
I 0  Cf. for example,  Su-ll Park, Part 3.
11  Very  recently,  in  1988-89, the  Korean government has  shown  a  new
commitment  to a  less interventionist  policy vis-a-vis labor markets.  The impact on
independent  wage  bargaining  was immediate.  After two successive  years  of double-digit
nominal wage increase,  the FKTU  was asking for a 27 percent wage increase  in the
spring  negotiations  of 1989. This was  countered  by the FKI's offer of a wage  increase  in
the range  of 8.9-12.9  percent  depending  on the sector. The government  suggested  that
nominal  wage increases  should  be no higher  than real productivity  gains.  But as shown
by continuing labor unrest, including  large-scale  strikes, this informal Incomes  policy
is experiencing  real difficulty in implementation.1 9
In fact, with or without government  encouragement,  Korean industry showed
strong  predilections  towards a profit-sharing  system  of remuneration. The basic wage
constituted no more than 75 percent of total monthly earnings in the early 70s and
seems  to have  fallen to 70 percent  in the 80s. 12 Overtime  pay and annual  bonuses-both
of  which are  related to  business conditions and profitability-constitute  the  rest.
Secondly, the industrial firms, particularly the larger ones seem to  have formed the
internal  labor market structure. The level of starting  wages in Korea is predominantly
determined  by the worker's  formal  schooling  and sex, regardless  of job content. 13 This
basic wage rises on an almost regular  basis by certain fixed amounts-the so-called
"annual  base-up."  This "base-up" is directly related to the length of service in the
company,  and is not necessarily  associated  with any promotion  in job status. Promotion
takes the form of skipping several "base-ups." One econometric  study found that "in
the case of male workers,  one year of "inside" experience  (with the same employer)
tended to raise wages on average  by about 10 percent,  whereas  one year of outside
experience  (with a different employer)  raised them by an average  of only about 3.8
percent." 1 4
With a strong  mechanism  of rewarding  firm-specific  skills in place,  clearly  a
major  incentive  for efficiency  would  be the  sharing  of the  gains  of productivity  increase
with the workers. The question  might  be asked: what is the  exact  nature  of firm-
specific  skills  which  were  being  rewarded?
Amsden  makes  the  point  that Korea  depended  heavily  on imported  technology-and
had little experience  in these technologies  with the possible  exception  of textiles.
"Korean  managers  could  never  hope  to manage  in a tight,  "Taylorist"  top-down  fashion,
at least not initially,  because  no one at the top knew  enough  about  the process  (of
The domestic  change  in the labor market  scene  after  the government  moved
towards  a "hands-off'  policy  underlines  the importance  of its impact  on wage  behavior
through  the  previous  periods  of Korean  development.
1  2  Funkoo  Park,  Table  17,  p. 38  based  on  the  Ministry  of Labor's  Occupational  Wage
Survey.
1  3  This account  follows  Su-ll  Park,  Chapter  V.
14  Amsden  (1990),  p. 88 quoting  Lee (1983).20
production)  to do so.  Under  these conditions,  it was imperative  to rely upon motivated
workers,  even If they possessed  little more than formal  schooling,  to exercise  the most
fundamental  skill of all-intelligence." 15 This was particularly  so because  the demands
of an export-oriented  strategy  were quite severe  on the maintenance  of product  quality.
A  profit-sharing model of  wage determination could  explain the  observed
increase  in real wage-at  a rate a little below productivity  growth in the period before
1974 and again after the adjustment  of 1980-81. The successful  wage repression  of
1971, 1975 and 1980-81, which contributed  strongly to  the stabilization effort, has
the hallmark  of state paternalism  in wage setting.
The question  still might be asked: why did wages increase  significantly  faster
than productivity  in the period  of "big push"  in the second  half of the 70s?  The answer
is  probably  that  the  high  optimism  of  the  state  driven  investments towards
diversification  was one of the factors. The other was the tightness  of the labor market
caused  not only by the "big push,"  but also the rather  sudden  and substantial  emigration
of Korean  workers  to the Middle  East,  to help in the latter's post-oil  construction  boom.
As can be seen from Table A.1 the unemployment  rate fell to an historic low in
1978.  It might be mentioned  that the unemployment  rate touched this low again in
1986, and fell even lower in 1987 and 1988. As already  pointed  out, the events  of the
last few years have created a new situation in the Korean labor market.  The wage
explosion,  which is still underway,  is as much  due to the tightness  of the labor market,
as to the less paternalistic role of  the government  in wage determination,  and the
emergence  of union  activism  as a powerful  force.
An attempt  was made to test these points with an econometric  model of wage
determination. Our model was the usual augmented  Phillips curve together with an
element to capture the profit-sharing  aspect.  It is hypothesized  that workers have a
target real wage in any period which is governed by the productivity growth of  a
previous  period.  If the percentage  increase  in real wage falls short of the percentage
increase  in productivity  of the earlier period, then there is additional  upward  pressure
on money  wages. It should  be noted  that the  mechanism  of the target  wage  could  percolate
15  Amsden (1990), p. 89.21
through  the decision  of workers  or of employers or of both.  The model  would  thus look
like the following:
W t = a + b P e + c Ut - x + d(v t . y - w t - y)  *---(3)
where  W t G  percentage  change  in money  wage  in the current  period;
Pe = expected  rate of inflation;
Ut -x = unemployment  rate x periods  before;
v t - y = percentage  increase  in productivity  y periods  before
w t - y = percentage  increase  in real wages  y periods  before.
The  values  of x and  y are  found  by the best  fit of the model  to the  data.
The model was estimated with quarterly data for the period 1970.3-1988.3.
The results  are given in Table 111.2.  The expected  inflation  rate is approximated  by the
rate of  increase in the CPI in the previous  period.  (It could also be interpreted  as
representing  workers' effort to recapture  lost real wages as a result of fast inflation).
In the first equation reported in Table 111.2,  we get a reasonably  good fit with all the
variables  having  the right sign and strong  significance.
The second equation increases thu  R2 substantially without  reducing the
significance  of the explanatory  variables  significantly. The extra term DNOMAW(-4)  is
the percentage  change in money wages since four quarters before the present. The
inclusion  of the variable  increases  the R2 by so much  because  there  is a strong  seasonal
pattern  in the money  wage series. 16 17
The footnotes  to the table define  the variables. The fitted equations  support  our
hypothesis  strongly. Both the rate of unemployment  and the target real wage based  on
actual productivity  increase  enter  the process  of wage determination.
1  6  In particular,  average  earnings  in the fourth quarter  of each year are bumped  up
as workers  are paid their annual  bonus.
1  7  Note  that the variable  TARGET  (-2) in Table 111.2  can be broken  down into rates
of growth  of money  wages,  prices,  and productivity,  all lagged  two periods. When  we
tried productivity  only without  the lagged  wage  and price indices,  the estimated  equation
performed  less  well, with a smaller  R2 and greatly reduced  significance  of the TARGET
variable.22
Table 111.2 Determinants  of  Percentage Changes In  Nominal Wages
1970-1988,  Quarterly  Data
Regression Analysis (OLS  Estimates)
Durbin
Adjusted  Watson
Constant  DCPI(-1)  LER  Target(-2)  DNOMAW(-4) R-squared Statistic  F-Statistic
0.135  0.869  -0.028  0.214  -.-  0.519  2.24  25.8
(5.87)  (4.05)  (-5.23)  (4.51)
0.070  0.478  -0.016  0.097  0.59  0.695  2.24  40.3
(3.30)  (2.62)  (-3.39)  (2.30)  (6.25)
DNOMAW:  Percentage  change  in nominal  monthly  earnings  per regular  employee
in manufacturing,  averaged  for each  quarter
DCPI(-1):  Inflation  rate lagged  one quarter.
UER:  Unemployment  rate.
TARGET(-2):  Difference  between  growth  in productivity  and growth in real wages.
The variable  is lagged  two quarters.
DNOMAW(-4): The dependent  variable  lagged  four  quarters.
Periods  covered by both regressions  go from the second  quarter of  1971 to the third
quarter of 1988 (70 observations). Figures  in parentheses  are t-statistics.23
IV.  The Structure  of  Korean  Labor Markets and
Wage  Dlfferentials
The discussion  on wages and productivity  in Section III referred to the formal
manufacturing  sector. The coverage  of the datd was limited  to wage employees  in firms
employing  more  than 10 workers. A great  deal of employment  in Korea  has always  been
in the informal  sector.
The size of the informal  sector  employment  could  be estimated  by comparing  two
sources of employment  data:  the Economically  Active Population Survey (EAPS),
Economic  Planning  Board,  which  estimates  total employment  on the basis  of a household
survey and the Actual Labor Conditions at Establishment  (ALCE), Ministry  of  Labor,
which estimates  employment  on the basis of a survey  of establishments  above  a certain
employment  size. 18
Unfortunately,  the ALCE excludes  public sector employment  from its estimates.
Thus, the comparison  has to be limited to the "production  sector' of the economy-
agriculture, mining, manufacturing  and construction.  A comparison for 1979 shows
that practically  the whole of the 5 million employed  in the agriculture  sector  and a third
of the 3 million in manufacturing  were in the informal sector.  Furthermore,  a special
census of the "commerce"  sector (wholesale  and retail trade, hotels and restaurants)
for 1979 also revealed  that 90 percent  of the 1.3 million  people were in establishments
employing  less than ten workers. 19 The agricultural  sector has been declining  over
time, but the trends in employment  in the informal  component  of the secondary  and
tertiary sector are not very clear.  Likewise,  data deficiency does not allow one to
analyze trends in earnings in all parts of the informal  economy. But it is possible to
examine  some specific aspects  of the earnings  difference  between  the formal and the
informal sectors which appear to be important. These include (i) the farm/non-farm
differential; (ii) differentiation in earnings by size of  firm within the manufacturing
sector; and (iii) the male/female  differential.  In what follows we shall be concerned
with behavior of  the  earnings differences over the  long period of  the  structural
18  Five or more workers until 1979 and ten or more workers after 1980.
"9  Lindauer,  Table 18, p. 72 and p. 73, last paragraph.24
transformation  of the Korean economy, as well as the short-run behavior during the
periods  of stabilization  and adjustment  following  the oil price shocks.
Farm/Non-farm Differential
Korean data sources allow us to compare  average annual farm incomes  with
annual earnings in manufacturing  or with the average  income of urban salary and/or
wage  earners.  (The sample of  salary  earners includes white  collar  workers).
Alternatively, we  can compare real daily farm wages with real daily earnings in
manufacturing.  Because  of the small number  of wage eamners  in agriculture  relative  to
farm-operators,  the analysis of relative farm earnings is more significant. The series
are graphed  in Figure  6.  The actual  data and discussion  of sources  are given in Annex
Table A.5  It it seen that in the period  of expansion,  1966 to the first oil crisis of 1973,
farm incomes  per earner  increased  at only a slightly slower  rate than average  earnings
in manufacturing. The differential in favor of manufacturing  increased somewhat  to
about  50 percent  at the end of the period. The  urban  wage  earner's  household  income  per
earner was significantly  higher. 20 But over the pe"iod  the rate of growth  of household
income was substantially lower than that of farm income, so that the differential  was
squeezed.
After the stabilization  efforts following  the oil crisis, urban earnings stagnated
for a couple  of years. Manufacturing  earnings  had a very low growth only in 1975, but
urban wage earners' income  seems  to have fallen before this, both in 1973 and 1674.
The slowdown  of the economy,  however,  had no impact  on the growth of income  in the
farm  sector.  The  rural/urban earnings difference definitely fell  in  this  period of
adjustment.
Earnings  in the non-farm  sector took a sharp upward  turn during the period  of
the "big push' in the second  half of the 70s. We have seen above  in Section  II that real
wages in manufacturing  increased  at a rapid rate-above the rate of growth of labor
productivity.  It  is apparent from Figure 6 that the income per earnings in urban
households  went up even faster.  The average  income of urban salaried households
increased  much  faster than  that of wage  earners  indicating  the increased  lightness  in the
20  This may be due to (a) the exclusion  from the sample  of single member  urban
households who  would presumably have low  earnings, and  (b)  the  inclusion of
supplementary  incomes  from other sources  in the family  income.figure  6
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market for white collar labor.  Farm incomes  per worker increased  by about the same
absolute  amount  per year as in the previous  period, so that the rate of growth slowed
down. The period of the "big push"  then widened  the rural/urban  wage differential  by a
substantial  amount. In 1979  manufacturing  wages  were 80 percent  higher  than farming
earnings  and urban wage  earners'  income  100 percent  higher.
As in the first episode  of stabilization,  urban  earnings  in the period  following  the
second  oil shock  fell, while farm earnings  continued  to grow at much  the same  rate. The
rural/urban  differential  fell, but not by enough to restore it to the levels of the early
70s.  Since 1982 rural and urban earnings  have increased  at a rather  similar rate.  The
widening  of the differential  in favor of urban wage earners  which took place in the late
70s  seems  to have  been  a permanent  one.
It has been maintained  that the comparison  of average  incomes,  particularly  after
the stabilization  program  of the eighties, may be giving too favorable  a picture for the
farm sector.  The deficit in the Grain Management  Fund-which, as we have seen,
supported  the prices  paid to farmers  above  the prices  of cereals  sold to consumers-was
drastically  (educed  as part of the stabilization  package  in the years following  1981. The
slowing  down in the rate of inflation  clearly helped the process  of deficit reduction,  but
it has been suggested  that the terms  of trade  for the farming  population  did deteriorate.
Amsden  believes  that such a deterioration  was mainly  responsible  for the mass exodus
between 1982 and 1985 out of agriculture-"even larger than the migration  associated
with the 1980 harvest  failure. 21 Moreover,  "the last wave of migrants  was believed  to
consist of relatively  older people,  unequipped  to enter the labor force and unaccounted
for  in the unemployment  statistics which, therefore, were lower than otherwise." 22
The outmigration from agriculture might, indeed, have prevented the  rural-urban
differential from increasing further in favor of  the urban sector in the post  1981
period. Also the earnings  distribution  within the farm sector might have deteriorated  (a
point on which there is no statistical  information). In any case, taken in conjunction
with the point established  that the earnings  differential  in favor of urban workers  was at
a higher  level in the 80s than it was in the early 70s, the discussion  does imply that the
21  Amsden,  p. 36.
22  Amsden,  p. 36.27
farming sector did suffer a relative deprivation  after the boom of the late 70s and the
subsequent  adjustment  of the  economy.
Wage  Difference  by Size  of Firms
The difference  in labor earnings  between  the informal  and the formal sectors  in
the non-farm economy is of  major interest in the history of  Korean development.
Unfortunately,  the absence  of comparable  household  surveys  over a period  of time does
not allow us to look at trends in differentials  for too many subsectors. Information  does
exist, however,  on wage difference  by size groups  of firms in manufacturing.  The wage
levels in small firms could be expected  to approximate  levels  of earnings  in the informal
sector. Thus a study  of wage  difference  by size  of firms is of interest.
It has been well-known  to students  of the Korean  economy  for some  time that the
government policies which led to  export oriented industrialization  also produced a
dualism in the manufacturing  sector.  "While government policy towards domestic
market-oriented  small-scale industry has been characterized by benign neglect or
active discrimination,  export/large  scale sector has enjoyed considerable  advantages
from the government  through  direct and indirect  subsidies." 23
A central role in this process  of differentiations  was played  by credit  policy. The
preferential  interest  rate on export  credit was reduced  to 6 percent in June 1967 while
the ordinary bank rate was set in 1965 at 26 percent. In addition,  the exporting  firms
enjoyed  a string of preferences  in import  licenses,  tax concessions  and favorable  tariff
rates for imported  inputs.  "These  subsidies  were disproportionately  favorable  to large-
scale industries.  In 1974, only 6 percent of small- or medium-scale  industries (less
than  200  en,ployees) were  designated by  government as  "export  lndustries.t
Government export subsidies were  also scaled according to  export volume and
performance." 24
23  Su II Park,  p. 57.  See  Chapter  II of this work  for an extended  discussion  of the
issues  summarized  here.
24  Ibid.,  p. 61.28
Korean industry was  also encouraged to  adopt state-of-the-art technology
developed  in the high Income  countries,  to enable It to cater to the needs of the world
markets. This led to the adoption  of capital intensive  technology-a trend  abetted  by the
low cost of loanable  funds. Further,  the recently  designed  technology  of mass  production
favors large scale operations to reap the benefits of machine specialization. Thus,
successive plants,  in  the  exports industries in  Korea, have  been designed for
increasingly  large-scale  production.
The difference in technology and labor productivity between large and small
firms are associated  with large differences  in wages.  To some extent the observed
difference  in average  earnings  per worker reflect differences  in skil! composition. But,
as we shall see, even for a relatively  homogeneous  group like production  workers  who
are dominated  by the semi-skilled,  very large wage differentials  exist.  An element  of
profit-sharing  clearly enters into the high wages paid by large firms who have such
high labor productivity. As already mentioned  in Section III, the importance  of labor
unions,  in the determination  of wages  was relatively  small. On the other hand, there is
considerable  evidence  of employer  paternalism,  mixed in with incentives  for efficiency
and low turnover, in the setting  of wages at high levels in the large firms.  It will be
recalled, in particular, that basic wages account for only a part of total earnings in
Korea.  Various allowances  and annt zI special earnings bonuses are a substantial
component  of earnings,  and this proportion  seems to increase  sharply with firm size
(see below).
Table IV.1 gives the evolution  of employment,  output and labor productivity  by
firm size between  1960 and 1982. Note that the definitions  of small, medium  and large
firms are different in 1960 and 1963 from the definitions for later years.  The data
show the enormous importance  of  firms with less than 100 employees (small and
medium  categories  in the table) in the early sixties.  The "small" (employing  less than
30 workers)  employed  45 percent  of the workers  and produced  a third of gross output.
Value added  per worker in the small  firms was half of that in the large firms, and in the
medium  firms it was two-thirds  of the large.
A major change  seems  to have taken  place between  1969  and 1975. The large
firms expanded  fast at the expense  of the small,  the share  of the latter dipping from 32
to  17 percent in terms of  employment,  and from 17 to 8 percent in terms of gross29
output.  At the same time, the difference  In value added  per worker narrowed  markedly
(from 14 percent of the level in large firms in 1969 to 40 percent In 1975).
The shocks of the mid-70s  and the early 80s seem to have arrested the fast
relative expansion of  large firms.  This, in spite of  the "big push" of  the 1975-79
period. The proportion  of employment  in large firms fell from 62 to 55 percent. The
Table  IV.1  Technology,  Size  and  Productivity  Differentials  In  Manufacturing
Establishments
No. of Employees  Gross  Output  Value  Added  Fixed Assets
Year  (% of Total)  (% of Total)  per Worker  Index  per Worker  Index
1960:
Small  45.2  36.9  59.4  n/a
Medium  22.4  20.4  67.8  n/a
Large  32.3  42.6  100.0  n/a
1963
Small  42.0  31.5  46.3  n/a
Medium  23.0  22.9  66.8  n/a
Large  34.9  45.5  100.0  n/a
1969
Small  31.6  16.6  14.2  16.6
Medium  20.1  15.0  19.8  43.2
Large  48.2  68.3  100.0  100.0
1975
Small  17.4  8.3  40.5  18.6
Medium  20.2  15.7  69.6  35.4
Large  62.3  75.8  100.0  100.0
1980
Small  18.3  8.1  42.5  19.8
Medium  22.7  15.6  61.1  42.4
Large  58.9  76.1  100.0  100.0
1982
Small  21.4  9.1  37.2  22.7
Medium  23.3  17.1  57.1  39.5
Large  55.1  73.6  100.0  100.0
Note:  For the years 1960 and 1963, Small - 5-29, Medium  =  30-99, and Large , 100+
For the years 1969, 1975, 1980 and 1982, Small =  5-49, Medium  =  50-199, and
Large =  200+
Source-  Report  on Mining  and Manufacturing  Survey30
difference  in value  added  per worker,  however,  might  have  widened  somewhat,  reflecting
perhaps  rationalization  and weeding  out of less efficient  firms in the large  scale sector.
Thus, while the Korean  experience  supports  tne a priori model  of a shrinkage  of
the large firm sector during the periods of adjustment  with the "slack" taken up by
small firms, the changes are not nearly as dramatic in the difficult period of 1975-82
compared  to the expansionary  phase of 1969-75.
Turning to the differential in earnings by size of firm in manufacturing,  Table
IV.2 gives the differentials  in average  earnings. These  data show a substantial  increase
in the differential, particularly with respect to  small firms during the decade of the
60s.  The trend was reversed  in the seventies,  both in the years leading  up to the first
oil crisis, and subsequently  during the period  of the "big push." By the end of the 70s
the small-large  differential  was about the same level as in 1960.  But the second oil
crisis and the adjustment  of the 80's saw again a widening  of the differential--but  to a
smaller  extent than in the 60s.
Table  IV.2  Differentials In  Average Remuneration  by  Firm Size
In  South  Korean  Manufacturing
1 960-1  986
Large/Small  Medium/Small  Large/Medium
Year  (Small  = 100)  (Small = 100)  (Medium  = 100)
1960  136.5  99.9  136.6
1967  155.7  126.9  122.7
1970  180.9  147.6  122.6
1974  152.4  129.3  117.8
1979  130.1  115.9  112.3
1983  147.6  120.3  122.7
1986  149.0  119.4  124.8
Note:  Small firms are defined as having 5-49 workers; medium,  50-199, and large, 200 or
more workers.
Source:  Korea--Statistical  Yearbooks  (1962, 1976, 1981, 1985 and Reports on Mining and
Manufacturing  Surveys  for 1967 and 1970.31
Table. IV.3  Earnings Differentials by Size of  Firm, Sex, Occupation and
Educational Level of  Workers In  Korean Industries
1967  and  1980
(Base - 100, Firms with 10-29 Workers  in each Category)
University  Middle  or Elementary
Firm Size  Graduate  School  Graduate
(No. of workers)  Male  Female  Male  Female
1967  1980  1967  1980  1967  1980  1967  1980
10-29  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
30-99  117.6  103.4  88.5  88.7  113.0  105.1  107.3  98.2
100-299  131.7  111.3  126.5  109.3  124.3  125.2  124.0  103.6
300-499  149.2  112.1  99.9  101.5  157.4  131.7  132.5  104.7
500+  171.0  113.6  96.4  119.0  1 201.9  133.4  163.3  107.9
Note:  For 1967,  firm size ranges  from 100 to 199 (instead  of 1980 range that goes from 100  to
299); and from 200 to 499 (in 1980,  it ranges  from 300 to 499).  Therefore,  comparisons
between  these  two groups  should  take into account  this fact.  The category  for male and
female with middle  school and under for 1967 refers  to production  workers.
Source:  Report  on Wage Survey,  1967,  the Bank of Korea,  Table 2, pp. 50-65.
Report on Occupational  Wage Survey,  Administration  of Labour  Affairs, 1980,  Vol. I,
Tables 111.4  and 111.5,  pp. 336-461.
The data of Table IV.2 do not control for skill, education  and skill differences.
When  we do control for such  differences,  as is done in Table IV.3,  it is seen  that there  is
a significant  decline  in the differentials  in 1980 compared  to the levels of 1967  except
perhaps  for female  university  graduates. Taken  together  with  the evidence  of Table IV.2,
we could conclude  that there has, indeed,  been an accentuation  of dualism  within the
manufacturing  sector of Korea before 1971.  But this process  was reversed  in the next
decade.  It was threatening  re-establishing  itself again in the early 80s.  It would be
very interesting  to see, when more  recent  data are available,  if the wage explosion  of the
late 80s has contributed  substantially  to the accentuation  of dualism.
Male-Female Differences
Table IV.4 gives the participation  rates of males  and females,  separately  for farm
and non-farm households. It is seen that the participation  rate for females in farm
households  does not show  much  of a trend. But the rate  in non-farm  households,  although32
well below the rate in farm households,  has been slowly increasing  over the period
(with  small  cyclical  dips  in  1981  and  1985).  But  the  increase in  non-farm
participation  has by no means  been  spectacular.  The process  of development  generally  is
accompanied  by substantial increases In female participation arising both from the
supply  and  demand  sides. On the supply  side important  factors  helping  the process  are
Table  IV.4:  Labor  Force  Participation  Rates, by  Sex (percentage)
Farm  Households  Non-Farm  Households
Male  Female  All  Male  Female  All
1970  75.2  48.2  60.9  75.1  29.8  51.5
1975  73.8  51.8  62.7  75.1  31.2  52.5
1976  74.5  55.3  64.8  74.7  33.7  53.3
1977  74.3  52.5  63.3  76.9  33.5  54.0
1  978  74.5  54.0  63.9  75.3  35.6  54.6
1  979  73.5  54.2  63.6  74.4  35.9  54.4
1980  72.4  53.0  62.5  74.2  36.1  54.4
1  981  72.1  53.4  62.6  73.7  35.4  53.8
1982  70.4  53.6  61.9  73.4  37.5  54.7
1  983  68.7  51.3  59.8  71.8  37.9  54.2
1  984  68.8  50.1  59.3  69.6  36.1  52.2
1985  68.9  50.7  59.7  69.8  37.7  53.1
Source:  Economically  Active Population  Survey,  reproduced  from Grootaert,  Table 2,
p. 5
rising levels of education,  reduced  fertility and a general  change in attitudes  to market
work on the part of women. The educational  expansion  in Korea  seems  to have  benefited
women  as much  as men. The average  years  of schooling  of women  has risen from 2.92
years in 1960 to  6.63 years in 1980 (as against the overall average of 3.86 and
7.61).25  At the same time fertility levels  have declined  drastically  (by more than half
in the last twenty years) reducing  the number  of small children at home.  This would
tend  to  increase  market  activity  for  married  females.  On  the  demand side,
industrialization and  the  growth  of  urban  services-social  and  private-create
opportunities  for female employment. What makes  the Korean  case unusual is that in
spite  of the presence  of these  factors  at levels  above  those  for other developing  countries
25  Ibid., p. 6.33
the non-farm  participation  rate for females is, after two decades  of development,  well
below  those  of other countries. 26
Institutional  changes  facilitating  greater participation  of women in the non-farm
workforce have been slow In coming.  Grootaert  points out that part-time  work Is not
very common for women in Korea-only  about 7-8 percent working 35 hours or less
per week.  In fact, the distribution  of workers  by hours worked  showed  little difference
between  men  and women,  except  that men  do more  overtime  work (more  than  54 hours  a
week). 27 Evidently  Korean  employers  have not taken the initiative in developing  the
market  for jobs in clerical,  sales and assembly  line production  work which can be easily
split into two part-time  jobs.  Grootaert also points out that there has been limited
government  effort in establishing  public day-care  centers,  and there have been various
restrictions on private sector initiatives.
Turning to the composition  of female employment  in the non-farm sector, the
time series for the proportion  of female employment  by industry  and by occupation  are
given in Tables IV.5 and IV.6, respectively. As far as mining and manufacturing  are
concerned,  the percentage  of women  workers  increased  at a modest  but steady  rate until
1980 and has declined somewhat  since.  Thare was, however,  a decline in the crisis
years following  the first oil shock in 1974 and 1975. Thus, there is evidence  that the
proportion of women in manufacturing  employment  responds significantly  to  cyclical
demand  factors.
The increase  of less  than 10 percentage  points  in the share  of female  employment
in industry must, however,  be considered  rather marginal  compared  to the large shifts
in the industrial structure of  the economy in the twenty-year period.  Much more
pronounced  growth  of female  employment  is seen in the occupations  categories  in Table
IV.7. This is particularly  so in the clerical and service  categories  where  the proportion
of women  in total employment  has  been  doubled.
26  Even  the neighborirg  countries  of Asia had significantly  higher  rates. 49.7 for
Hong  Kong,  48.9  for Japan,  45.8  for Singapore  and a high  of 78.4  for Thailand. USA  and
Canada  has  rates  of around  52 percent  (Grootaert,  p. 6, quoting  the ILO  Yearbook  for
1  984).
27  Grootaert,  Table 10, p. 15.34
It has, however, been noticed that the  increase in female employment in these
white  collar  categories  has  been  confined  to  narrow  low-income  groups.  'Clearly
clerical work  has  undergone a  major and  rapid image shift from a  male to a  female
occupation...  More than  80  percent of  the  clerical  workforce  below 25  (in  1984) are
women;  the  clerical  workforce  above  age 35  is  95 percent  male."28 In the service
categories there is evidence of  severe "crowding" of women into two sub groups-viz.
teachers  and  "medical, dental  and veterinary  personnel."  In the  "administrative and
managerial" category only  2.9  percent are women-far  below the  proportion  in  other
East Asian countries. 29
Table  IV.5  Evolution  of  Female  Employment  by  Industry
(Women  Workers  as  a  Percent  of  Total)
Year  Agriculture  Mining &  Manufacturing  Construction  Services
1963  37.98  27.89  8.81  32.26
1964  37.97  29.57  3.83  32.08
1965  38.32  28.03  4.62  34.30
1966  38.84  29.46  3.35  31.79
1967  39.28  30.76  3.86  32.35
1968  40.22  31.75  6.01  34.22
1969  39.01  32.76  8.01  33.59
1970  41.62  31.18  1.76  34.67
1 971  41.82  33.40  2.59  34.27
1972  42.95  33.09  2.30  32.90
1973  42.13  37.78  2.96  34.67
1974  41.51  35.31  5.11  35.59
1975  41.53  33.55  4.89  35.91
1 976  42.64  37.59  4.91  37.33
1977  41.59  37.99  7.84  35.12
1978  44.10  38.39  7.67  36.56
1979  44.57  38.52  7.66  37.54
1980  43.77  38.05  8.56  38.23
1981  43.66  37.72  7.89  38.43
1982  43.74  37.30  6.98  41.01
1983  43.16  37.10  6.99  42.13
1984  42.72  36.49  7.42  41.43
Source: Economic  Planning  Board: Year  Book of Labor  Statistics
28  Grootaert, p. 20.
29  The percentages  are 13.1 in Hong Kong, 6.1 in Japan, 17.4 in S;ngapore and
19.8 in Thailand.  (Grootaert, Table 14, p. 22, citing ILO sources).35
Table  IV.6  Evolution  of  Female Employment by  Occupation
(Women Workers  as  a  Percent of  Total)
Products  & Equipment
Year  Professional  Clerical  Sales  Service  Agriculture  Operations
1963  21.46  11.28  44.81  19.83  38.08  19.83
1964  19.18  10.20  45.52  20.64  38.00  20.64
1965  18.03  10.03  46.21  20.06  38.38  20.06
1966  16.73  9.85  43.97  22.21  38.67  22.21
1967  16.14  11.63  42.77  23.61  39.37  23.61
1968  16.25  17.00  44.25  24.38  40.35  24.38
1969  15.57  13.81  42.95  25.09  39.30  25.09
1970  18.40  13.54  42.70  57.70  42.36  23.35
1971  19.43  16.55  41.25  23.72  41.92  23.72
1972  16.45  16.79  42.10  22.81  42.93  22.81
1973  19.11  17.83  42.08  27.88  41.99  27.88
1974  19.90  19.39  41.67  26.92  41.43  26.92
1975  20.86  20.88  40.72  57.38  41.41  25.84
1976  20.56  23.08  43.03  58.44  42.57  29.96
1977  22.53  24.47  41.60  54.38  41.61  29.92
1978  25.08  27.67  42.21  56.14  44.17  29.16
1979  26.34  30.60  43.41  56.27  44.62  29.02
1980  25.34  32.75  43.72  58.12  43.83  27.73
1981  23.54  33.62  44.21  57.72  43.82  26.68
1982  26.64  34.12  45.96  58.18  44.00  27.10
1983  26.67  34.21  47.35  59.99  43.38  27.89
1984  27.16  33.58  46.82  60.72  42.99  26.99
Source:  Economic  Planning  Board,  Year  Book  of Labour  Statistics.
This survey  covers all individuals  14+ except  armed forces, foreigners  and prisoners.
Another  aspect  of the differential  conditions  of empioyment  by sex Is revealed  by
looking at the changes in employment  by work steaus. The employed  labor force is
classified  into self-employed  workers,  family workers and employees. The distinction
between  the first two is important  for work status.  A self-employed  person  could be a
small entrepreneur,  and often has  earnings  above  wages  eamed  by employees.  A family
worker, on the other hand, is a working  unpaid  member  of the household. One of the
most striking developments in  Korea is  that in  1984 nearly 80 percent of  family
workers  in the mining  and manufacturing  sector  were females. Between  1976 and 1984
the proportion  of females  among  employees  remained  unchanged. But the proportion  of
females among  family workers  went up from 65 to 80 percent,  while  the female's  share36
in  the  self-employed category was drastically reduced by  half to  26  percent. 3 0
Evidently,  during  the period  of the "big push"  and the subsequent  adjustment  there was
a sharp  drop in the role of women  as entrepreneurs.
Another  feature  of Korean  labor markets  is that within  employees  there  are three
categories, regular, temporary and daily workers.  We have referred earlier to the
Importance  of internal  labor markets  in Korean  manufacturing.  Because  of the security
of tenure and access  to bonuses  and other benefits  which internal  labor markets  imply,
Korean employers use a  large proportion of  the workforce on temporary or daily
contracts. This gives flexibility  to the size of the workforce  and lowers  the cost of labor,
particularly  when there is a decline in business  conditions. Table IV.8 gives the series
for the three  categories  of workers,  separately  for men  and women  for ti.e period 1963-
85.  It  is seen that the proportion of regulars among male workers has increased
substantially,  with only a dip between  1972  and 1975. But for female the proportion  in
1985  was about  the same  as in 1968. The percentage  of regulars  among  females  seems
to have fallen significantly  both after the first oil shock in 1973-75 and following the
second  period  of stabil;wation  in the early 80s.  It is only known  that regulars  are better
paid than temporaries,  partly because  they have claims to bonuses  and some fringe
benefits which the latter do not, and also the conditions  of employment  (eg. security  of
tenure) are better for the regulars.  Evidently,  women workers have been used in a
more  "marginal"  way in the last two decades.
30  Grootaert,  p. 27. and Table 18.37
Table  IV.7:  Percent Distribution  of Total  Employment by  Sex and  Status
(Non-farm  Households)
Males  Females
Regular  Temporary  Daily  Regular  Temporary  Daily
Year  Employees Employees  Workers  Employee  Employees  Workers
1963  49.6  17.6  32.6  34.6  2e.6  38.6
1964  48.6  20.4  30.8  32.0  34.0  33.8
1965  51.4  20.7  27.7  35.2  36.4  28.3
1966  55.3  17.4  27.2  39.3  30.0  30.6
1967  57.5  17.4  25.0  45.7  23.2  30.9
1968  62.9  14.5  22.4  49.0  22.5  28.4
1969  65.7  11.3  22.8  55.3  20.1  24.5
1970  68.8  11.8  19.2  57.9  22.1  19.8
1971  69.2  11.3  19.4  55.2  23.9  20.8
1972  62.4  12.6  24.8  52.0  26.7  21.1
1973  56.5  19.7  23.7  44.7  34.5  20.7
1974  62.3  17.0  20.5  46.7  33.3  19.8
1975  60.9  19.5  19.4  48.3  33.9  17.6
1977  64.9  15.6  19.3  54.9  26.1  18.8
1973  68.3  13.8  17.8  57.7  24.9  17.2
1980  71.5  12.1  16.2  58.5  24.6  16.7
1982  73.7  10.8  15.3  62.3  21.5  16.0
1984  71.9  14.7  13.2  50.6  30.5  18.7
1985  72.3  14.9  12.8  48.8  30.4  20.8
Source:  Economic  Planning  Board;  Yearbook  of Labour  Statistics  (The survey  is based
on the population  aged 14 and over and not in the army, imprisoned,  or foreigners.
Turning to  earnings, the trend in  the female/male differential for  different
educational  groups is plotted in Figure 7.  It seems that while university  and college
educated females have improved their relative earnings since 1970 (although still
earning a little more than 70 percent of the male average),  the bulk of the female
workers with high or  middle level schooling have more or less the same relative
earnings  as in the early 70s. There  might  have been  a trend  towards  the reduction  of the38
gender differential for this group (particularly the high school graduates)  In the "big
push"  period  of the late 70s, but this gain has been lost in the 80s.39
Figure  7
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culture,  forestry,  fishing,  government  administration,
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Conclusion
This paper has investigated  the successful  adjustment  to external  shocks  of an
open economy with heavy dependence  on key imports.  In the Korean case, the
macroeconomic  problem,  as we have seen,  was accentuated  by a high investment  rate
maintained  throughout  the growth  process  of the last two decades. The rate of Investment
continuously  outrunning  the rate of domestic  savings kept the economy  walking on a
tightrope of external deficits on the current account as well as internal inflationary
pressures  for much of this period.  Maintenance  of external competitiveness  was of
central importance  to an export-oriented  economy.
The evidence  shows  that an active  exchange  rate policy  (continuous  devaluation  of
the won except  for a few years in the late 70s, and maxi devaluations  in the periods  of
"shock") has been central to the mechanism  which kept unit labor costs in dollars
falling throughout  the period.  But the success  of devaluation  in producing  the desired
result  depended  on policies  affecting  both the capital and labor markets. In the capital
markets, the maintenance  of cheap credit for the large scale sector cushioned the
exporting  firms from the rising costs of interest  pavments  and imported inputs which
devaluation  induced.  Equally important was the tight government  control of external
capital  flows which prevented  destabilizing  speculative  movements  of capital.
On  the  labor  market front, the  evidence shows the  importance of  state
paternalism  in wage negotiations  in the formal  sector in keeping  real wage increases  in
line with productivity  growth, but somewhat  below it  in most periods (again with the
exception of  the period of  the 'big  push").  It was also eminently successful in
drastically  slowing  down or even halting  real wage growth during  the short-run  periods
of  crisis.  But the wage-productivity  relationship behaved in the healthy way it  did
because  real wages increased  significantly  in most years.  This experience  must have
been instrumental  both in securing  worker  acquiescence  to the temporary  stagnation  of
wages and in preventing  destabilizing  inflationary  expectations  from developing.
The critical factor here was the strongly positive time trend in  total factor
productivity  growth. It is this which kept the rate of real wage  growth high, at the same
time that the unit labor cost in industry  was falling.4 1
Real wages in the large-scale  manufacturing  sector in Korea have "risen faster,
possibly than  in  any  previous or  contemporary Industrial revolution." 31 It was
suggested  in our analysis  that the major factor behind this real wage growth was most
likely profit-sharing  as an incentive  scheme  in the process  of wage determination. The
internal labor market structure  of the large firms in Korean  manufacturing  encouraged
this process,  as did state paternalism. We would  expect  that in large segments  of the
labor market, outside the large firms the mechanisms  of the internal labor markets
would be weak, and wages  would  be lower  in these segments  and would rise less fast.
This is, indeed, what has been suggested  by earlier writers.  For example, Amsden
writes:  "By world standards,  Korea has the highest inter-manufacturing  industry wage
dispersion  and the widest  gap in gross  wages  between  the sexes  (Krueger  and Summers,
1986; Jong Woo Lee, 1983).  Underlying  the rapid rise in real wages beginning in
1965 was the preening  of a labor aristocracy: male, employed  by the chaebol, in the
new heavy Industries. At the opposite  end of the spectrum  is the economically  active
population in the informal sector." 32
The absence of  comprehensive  household surveys in Korea precluded the
investigation of  formal-informal earnings differentials in  large parts of  the  labor
market. But we are able to look at a limited  range  of wage differentials. Earnings  in the
farm sector did not perform all that badly vis-a-vis average earnings in the non-farm
or urban sectors.  Up to the first oil shock of 1973 annual farm incomes  per worker
increased  at only a slightly  lower rate than the average  earnings  in manufacturing.  But
during the "big push" of the late 70s the differential  in favor of manufacturing  wages
increased  from 50 to 80 percent, and although it fell somewhat  after the adjustment
following  the second  oil shock,  it was in the mid-eighties  well above the earlier  levels.
Analysis of gross wage differentials  by firm size within the formal sector (i.e.,
excluding very  small  firms  employing less than  10  workers) shows very  large
differences  in average  earnings. The differential  in favor of large firms increased  to a
high point of 81 percent  in 1970, but then declined  to 30 percent in 1979. It increased
again in the early 80s, and might have gone up much more sharply with the wage
explosion in  the large scale sector.  Comparing wage differences between more
31  Amsden,  1990, p. 79.
32  Amsden,  1987, p. 4.42
homogeneous  categories  of labor, it Is seen that the differential  which, was about 100
percent in 1967 (for male middle  or elementary  school graduates),  fell to 33 percent  in
1980. At the same time, the large scale sector seems  to have taken  the main brunt of
short-run  adjustment  following  the oil shocks. Wages  stagnated  In this sector  for short
periods  after the adjustment,  and the relative  expansion  of the large  firms at the expense
of the small, which was going  on rapidly  until 1973, seems  to have been halted in the
next  decade.
Amsden  suggested  that "not only Korea set world records  with its growth rate in
wages, it  also has outcompeted  other countries in its discrimination  against women
workers."3 3 In section IV, we found evidence of  surprisingly small increases in
participation  rates of females in the non-farm  sectors; severe  occupational  crowding;  a
larger  proportion of  females  in  lower status  jobs  like  "temporaries" or  'family
workers," and more or  less constant wage differential in  favor of  male workers,
maintained  over the years..  Average  earnings  of female workers with high or middle
school  education  were 52 percent  of the earnings  of males  with similar  education. As is
to be expected,  females  seem  to have been disproportionately  affected  during  the post-
shock  periods  of sharp adjustment.
While Korea's record in solving some of these structural  problems  in the labor
market has not been very good, her astonishing  success in managing  the short-run
macro-economic  balance  in the economy  may also be threatened  in the future.  A full
analysis  of contemporary  developments  in the labor market  is beyond  the scope of this
paper. But we should,  in concluding,  draw  attention  to the explosive  increases  in wages
in manufacturing  since 1987. This type of wage push, emanating  from a breakdown  of
the traditional relationship  between  the Korean  Federation  of Trade Unions  and that of
Employers,  threatens  to upset  the wage-productivity  balance  which, we have seen, has
been  a key  to the success  of Korea's  macro-economic  stability. If wages  go soaring  above
productivity growth,  Korea's share  of  the  export market  relative to  her  close
competitors  will undoubtedly  be threatened,  and in addition,  there will be the threat of
inflationary spiral, and perhaps the need for much more painful adjustments when
external  shocks  develop  in the future. "A recent  study  of manufacturing  unit labor  costs
found that between 1980 and 1986 Taiwan's ULC rose 56% relative to Korea's.  In
33  Amsden,  1990,  p. 85.43
1987  and 1988 the two economies'  ULCs  increased  at the same  rate.  It was only in the
first quarter of 1989 that Korea's ULC began to increase  relative to Taiwan." 34 The
concem  of the coming  years  is how much  and in what way  is Korea  able to contain  these
new developments  in the labor market. The other significant  question  Is Korea's  ability
to sustain--if not to increase--the  record rate of total factor productivity  growth which
she  has  achieved  In the last  two  decades  or more.
34  Quoted  in World  Bank (1989), p. 7.44
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ANNEX48
Table  A.1  South  Korea:  Major  Economle Indicators
GNP  Current  Exports  Budget  Unemploy-
Growth  Account  Growth  Deficit  ment rate
Year  (%)  (%  GNP)  (%)  (%  GNP)  (%)
1967  6.60  -4.12  28.00  -.  6.2
1968  11.30  -7.49  42.20  -.-  5.1
1969  13.80  -7.76  36.9gu  -.-  4.8
1970  7.60  -7.35  34.00  1.60  4.5
1971  8.60  -9.38  27.90  2.30  4.5
1972  5.10  -3.56  52.10  4.60  4.5
1973  13.20  -2.28  98.60  1.60  4.0
1974  8.10  -13.05  38.30  4.00  4.1
1975  6.40  -9.05  13.90  4.60  4.1
1976  13.10  -1.09  51.80  2.90  3.9
1977  9.80  0.03  30.20  2.60  3.8
1978  9.80  -2.17  26.50  2.50  3.2
1979  7.20  -6.43  18.40  1.40  3.8
1980  -3.70  -9.56  16.30  3.20  5.2
1981  5.90  -7.21  21.40  4.70  4.5
1982  7.20  -3.91  2.80  4.40  4.3
1983  12.60  -2.07  11.90  1.60  4.1
1984  9.30  -1.62  19.60  1.40  3.8
1985  7.00  -1.01  3.50  1.00  4.0
1986  12.90  4.39  14.60  1.80  3.8
1987  12.80  7.39  36.20  -.  - 3.1
1988  12.20  7.84  28.40  . 2.5
Source:  Statistics Department, The Bank of Korea, 'Principal  Economic Indicatorse  (GNP and
exports growth,  1988 GNP growth  rate is  preliminary).
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook.49
Table A.2 South  Korea:  Net Barter and  Income Terms of  Trade
Net Barter  Income  Terms  Per Cent  Change
Year  Terms  of Trade  Barter  Income
1980=100
1963  111.48  1.21
1964  112.83  1.88  1.21  55.60
1965  114.87  3.36  1.81  78.39
1966  128.15  4.91  11.57  46.41
1967  132.85  6.23  3.66  26.80
1968  138.06  8.93  3.92  43.31
1969  133.27  12.40  -3.47  38.89
1970  134.19  16.06  0.69  29.45
1971  133.08  20.57  -0.82  28.09
1972  132.35  30.76  -0.55  49.56
1973  125.62  45.82  -5.08  48.97
1974  101.31  40.73  -19.35  -11.12
1  975  92.10  45.10  -9.09  10.74
1976  105.10  69.90  14.12  54.99
1  977  112.40  89.00  6.95  27.32
1978  117.80  106.70  4.80  19.89
1979  115.30  103.40  -2.12  -3.09
1980  100.00  100.00  -13.27  -3.29
1981  97.90  115.C0  -2.10  15.00
1982  102.20  127.90  4.39  11.22
1983  103.10  150.00  0.88  17.28
1984  105.30  177.10  2.13  18.07
1985  105.90  191.70  0.57  8.24
1986  114.70  234.70  8.31  22.43
1987  118.08  296.94  2.95  26.52
1988  121.36  344.87  2.78  16.14
Note:  Net barter  terms of trade are defined  as the ratio of export to import  unit value index.
Income  terms  of trade are defined  as the product  of the net barter  terms of trade and the
export quantum  index.50
Table A.3  South Korea:  Debt Ratios
DebVGNP  Debt/Exports
1970  23.48  144.35
1971  28.42  158.69
1972  30.76  143.84
1973  29.00  95.21
1974  33.00  95.57
1975  31.12  110.28
1976  28.30  85.82
1977  38.39  109.91
1978  34.59  100.89
1979  35.45  117.18
1980  52.97  130.57
1981  51.21  120.98
1982  55.11  131.65
1983  52.09  133.03
1984  49.70  125.10
1985  53.76  142.45
1986  44.46  111.35
1987  30.35  71.92
1988  14.94  38.06
Source: On-Line  Woiid  Development  Debt  Service.
Note:  Total external  debt equals  public,  publicly  guaranteed,  private non-guaranteed,
IMF credit,  short term debt, outstanding  and disbursed.51
Table A.4  South  Korea:  Data Used for  Unit  Labor Costs In  Manufacturing
Annual  Annual  Manuf.  Average
Value  Wages  Deflator  CPI  Exchange
Added  (billion  1980=  1  980=  Rate
Year  (billion wons)  wons)  100  100  (won/$)
1967  206.6  53.3  17.1  15.3  270.5
1968  300.1  76.6  18.3  17.0  276.7
1969  424.2  105.7  19.9  19.1  288.2
1970  547.9  137.1  22.3  22.2  310.6
1971  688.6  160.4  23.4  25.2  347.2
1972  899.3  211.5  26.7  28.1  392.9
1973  1379.6  310.3  29.9  29.0  398.3
1974  1867.2  451.3  37.7  36.1  404.5
1975  2828.1  651.6  45.4  45.2  484.0
1976  4075.1  1009.1  52.8  52.1  484.0
1977  5596.9  1460.4  58.5  57.4  484.0
1978  8193.0  2221.8  66.2  65.7  484.0
1979  9205.0  2922.1  78.9  77.7  484.0
1980  11857.0  3471.7  100.0  100.0  607.4
1981  15412.0  4133.5  113.7  121.3  681.0
1982  17306.0  4754.1  119.4  130.1  731.1
1983  20912.0  5499.6  122.8  134.5  775.8
1984  24656.0  6495.1  123.7  137.6  806.0
1985  26737.0  7244.5  126.7  141.0  870.0
1986  32882.0  8607.3  131.3  144.2  881.5
Source:  UN Yearbook  of Industrial  Statistics.
IMF International  Financial Statistics.
Bank of Korea.52
Table  A.5  (a):  Annual  Earnings  per Worker  In  the  Farming and
Manufacturing  Sectors
Real Annual  per Worker  Real Annual  Manufacturing
Farm  Income  Eai  nings
1980  Won  (%  Change  1980  Won  (%  Change
Year  (thousands)  per Annum)  (thousands)  per Annum)
1966  400  467
1967  426  6.4  520  11.1
1968  474  11.2  593  14.0
19969  518  9.2  707  19.2
1970  537  3.7  787  11.3
1971  660  22.9  826  5.0
1972  688  4.2  858  3.8
1973  735  6.8  924  7.8
1966-73
Average  555  11.9  710  13.9
1974  785  6.7  1004  8.6
1975  822  4.7  1018  1.4
1976  876  6.5  1190  16.8
1977  964  10.1  1446  21.4
1978  1004  4.1  1696  17.3
1974-78
Average  890  6.9  1271  17.2
1979  1072  6.7  1845  8.7
1980  1081  0.8  1760  -4.6
1981  1152  6.5  1742  -0.9
1982  1232  6.9  1864  6.9
1983  1292  4.8  2023  8.5
1984  1490  15.3  2138  5.7
1985  1579  5.9  2294  7.2
1979-85
Average  1271  7.8  1952  4.053
Table  A.5  (b):  Annual  Household Income per  Earner for  Urban Households
Annual  Real  Household  Income  per Earner
Salary  Earner  Households  Wage  Eamer  Households
1980  Won  (%  Change  1980  Won  (%  Change
Year  (thousands)  per Annum)  (thousands)  per Annum)
1966  1316  681
1967  1569  19.2  981  44.1
1968  1615  2.9  1006  2.4
1969  1609  -0.4  1038  3.2
1970  1562  -2.8  975  -6.0
1971  1652  5.7  1041  6.7
1972  1685  1.9  1073  3.0
1973  1690  0.2  1046  -2.5
1966-73
Average  1587  4.0  980  7.6
1974  1806  6.8  990  -5.3
1975  1873  3.7  1052  6.2
1976  2428  29.6  1146  8.9
1977  2932  20.7  1427  24.5
1978  3284  12.0  1851  29.6
1974-78
Average  2465  20.4  1293  21.7
1979  3507  6.7  2058  11.1
1980  3684  5.0  1985  -3.5
1981  3646  -1.0  2006  1.0
1982  3568  -2.1  1787  -10.9
1983  3760  5.3  1938  8.4
1984  3962  5.3  2074  7.0
1979-84
Average  3388  -16.6  1975  -16.654
Note  cn the  data
Data on daily farm wages  and incomes  were collected  from the Korean  National
Agricultural Cooperative's monthly report.  These same figures are reported in the
Statistical  Yearbook  published  by the Economic  Planning  Board. Census  years  were 1975
and 1970,  all other  years are based  on sample  surveys. The survey  is carried  out by the
Min'stry  of Agriculture  and Fisheries  and is based  on a sample  of farm households  engaged
primarily  in farming and cultivating  a plot of land more than 0.1 hectare. The survey  is
conducted  monthly and revised after censuses.  Income  includes agricultural  receipts,
side-business  receipts, non-business  receipts (wages, rent, etc.) and property (assets)
receipts  less farm and side business  expenses. Daily farm wages are also reported  in
these  documents. Here,  men's  daily wages  (cash  and in kind) are shown  for all workers.
The price index used to deflate farm incomes  was the prices paid by farmers
index, reported  in "he same  documents. These  prices are collected  at 85 rural markets
covering 201 items.
Farm income  was normalized  to per worker farm income by dividing total farm
income (including  income  from non-farm  sources)  by the number  of farm workers.
Data on manufacturing  earnings were extracted from the Statistics Yearbook
published  by the Economic  Planning  Board. These  statistics  are collected  by the Ministry
of  Labour in  a  Monthly  Wage Survey.  The  survey covers  all  manufacturing
establishments  with 10 or more employees. The earnings reported are the average
monthly  earnings  of all (men and women)  regular  employees. Regular  workers  are those
whose term of employment  contract  are one month  or more, and who worked  for more
than 45 days during the three months prior to the reporting day.  Monthly earnings
include  overtime  pay,  bonus  pay  and base  pay.
The deflator  used  to estimate  real earnings  for manufacturing  and urban  household
incomes was the all cities consumer  price index.  This is reported in the Economic
Planning  Board's  Statistics Yearbook. Average  price data are collected three times a
month at 9 principal  cities including  Seoul on 394 commodities  and services.  Up until
1965,  the city consumer  price index survey  was carried  out in Seoul alone.55
Urban  incomes  data  was  also  taken  from  the Statistics  Yearbook.  This data  is based
on the Family  Income  and Expenditure  Survey  conducted  by the Economic  Planning  Board
each month.  The survey covers all households  residing in one of Korea's 50 cities,
excluding farmer' households,  fishing households,  single person households,  foreign
households  and  households  whose  income  and  expenditure  are not  easily  Identified.  Income
includes  earnings,  Income  from subsidiary  jobs and other income.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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